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Abstract
The common thread between all attorney advertisements consists of
the delicate balance between the professionalism of the practice of law and
protected commercial speech under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.1 Traditionally, solicitation and advertising by lawyers has been
looked down upon in the practice of law
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INTRODUCTION

The common thread between all attorney advertisements consists of
the delicate balance between the professionalism of the practice of law and
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protected commercial speech under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.1 Traditionally, solicitation and advertising by lawyers has been
looked down upon in the practice of law.2 In order to maintain the nobleness
of the profession, lawyers were expected to build a reputation that would
attract their business and clientele.3 The prohibition on advertising began as
a rule of legal etiquette and not rules of ethics, as advertising regulations are
modernly viewed.4 Lawyers treated the legal profession more as a public
service rather than as a trade or means of earning a living.5 It was believed
that commercializing legal services would lower the nobleness and honor of
the profession.6
Over time, these strong views against attorney advertisements
evolved into a standard for rules of ethics. 7 The Canons of Professional
Ethics, drafted in 1908 by the American Bar Association (“ABA”), entirely
prohibited attorney advertising and solicitation, claiming advertising and
solicitation by lawyers was unprofessional.8 Later in 1969, the ABA drafted
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“ABA Model Code”), which
was adopted by every state in the nation and followed the Canons model of
prohibiting all forms of attorney advertisements.9 After the Supreme Court
of the United States decided in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona10 that attorney
advertisements were classified as commercial speech and thus protected
under the First Amendment, the ABA was left to change the standards of
attorney advertisements in order to reflect this landmark decision and to
uphold First Amendment protection of attorney advertisements.11 As a result
of this decision, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“ABA
Model Rules”) were drafted and later approved by the ABA in 1983,
allowing attorney advertisements, but strongly prohibiting in-person

1.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210–12
(1953).
2.
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210–12.
3.
Veronica Wooten Brace, Limits on Marketing of Attorney Services, 8 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 110 (1996).
4.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977); Brace, supra note 3,
at 110.
5.
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210; Brace, supra note 3, at 110.
6.
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 211–12.
7.
See Brace, supra note 3, at 110.
8.
CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908); Brace, supra
note 3, at 110–11.
9.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)–(B) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1975); Brace, supra note 3, at 111.
10.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
11.
Id. at 383–84; Brace, supra note 3, at 111; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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solicitation by lawyers.12 The ABA Model Rules have since served as the
model for professional lawyering codes for sixty-five percent of the states,
leaving the majority of the states to permit various forms of attorney
advertisements.13 Throughout the history of the legal profession, in response
to constitutional challenges and decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the ABA has amended both ABA Model Code and ABA Model
Rules, permitting attorney advertising but still retaining a heavy grip in
regulating advertising as much as the Constitution and the Supreme Court of
the United States has allowed.14
The delicate balance between the honor and nobleness of the legal
profession and the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech is
critical in the case of a Florida law firm that is challenging The Florida Bar’s
Standing Committee on Advertising for denying the firm’s proposed plan to
send automated text messages in hopes of obtaining potential clients.15 The
law firm’s plan consists of obtaining “a daily list provided by the . . . county
clerk of court to [retrieve] phone numbers of [people who had been] arrested
the previous day.”16 The law firm would then use these contacts to send
automated text messages advertising the firm’s legal services to these listed
individuals.17 The text messages would provide an opt out option for the
recipients to choose to not receive any future communications from the
firm. 18 The Committee found that the firm’s proposal of automated text
messages is considered direct solicitation and is thus prohibited by Rule 47.18(a) of The Florida Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct, 19 which
involves direct contact with prospective clients.20 The law firm countered
the Committee’s response by claiming that text messages are not similar to
direct telephone communications, and that due to modern habits and modern

12.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983);
Brace, supra note 3, at 111 n.19.
13.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (1983); Brace, supra note 3,
at 111.
14.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; Brace, supra note 3, at 111; see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (1983 & 2013); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-101 (1975).
15.
Nathan Hale, Fla. Bar Rejects Firm’s Plan to Send Ads Via Text
Messages, LAW360 (May 22, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/659251/flabar-rejects-firm-s-plan-to-send-ads-via-text-messages; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976);
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210–12.
16.
Hale, supra note 15.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(a) (2014).
20.
Id. r. 4-7.18 (2014); Hale, supra note 15.
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modes of communication, text messages serve the same purpose as email or
direct mail.21
This Comment will focus on commercial speech, the rights of
lawyers to advertise legal services, and the regulations that The Florida Bar
has placed on attorney advertisements.22 This Comment will also discuss
why Florida’s regulations on attorney advertisements are neither consistent
with the Supreme Court of the United States’ decisions, nor take into
consideration modern modes of communication utilized in today’s society.23
Part II of this Comment will examine regulations on attorney advertisements
on a national level and discuss the Supreme Court of the United States’
decisions regarding commercial speech and protection of attorney
advertisements and solicitations under the First Amendment, as well as the
ABA’s rules on attorney solicitation and advertising. 24 Part III of this
Comment will explain the various modes of attorney advertisements,
including direct and indirect solicitation of potential clients and targeted
letters to potential clients.25 Part IV of this Comment will introduce the State
of Florida’s rules regarding attorney advertisements and solicitations and
compare Florida’s rules to the ABA’s rules regarding attorney
advertisements.26 This Comment will then analyze attorney advertisements
via text messages in Part V and explain how text messages are indirect
modes of advertising and why Florida should consider modern modes of
communication in regulating attorney advertisements. 27 Ultimately, this
Comment will conclude that text messages can be considered direct
communications, which are protected forms of commercial speech that
should not be restricted by The Florida Bar.28
II.
A NATIONAL LOOK AT ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS: THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
A.

Opening the Door to Protection of Attorney Advertisements

Commercial speech was first recognized as protected speech under
the First Amendment in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Hale, supra note 15.
See infra Part II–IV.
See infra Part IV–V.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
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Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.29 In this case, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that commercial speech is entitled to protection under the
First Amendment, even if the speech is purely economic or the speaker’s
motive of the speech is to receive pecuniary gain. 30 The appellees,
consumers of prescription drugs, brought suit against the Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy challenging the validity of a Virginia statute under the
First Amendment. 31 The state statute prohibited pharmacists to advertise
prices of prescription drugs.32 The Court explained that commercial speech
was of general public interest and served as a benefit to society, providing
consumers with the knowledge and availability of goods and services.33 It
was further held that a state’s interest in protecting and upholding the
professionalism of the field might not be sufficient enough to maintain the
prohibition of an advertisement. 34 Ultimately, the Court extended First
Amendment protection to commercial speech and concluded that although a
state is free to regulate commercial speech, a state may not place a complete
ban on advertisements or commercial speech and keep the knowledge of the
availability of goods and services away from consumers.35
The protected First Amendment right to commercial speech was
extended to attorney advertisements in the case of Bates.36 This was the first
case subsequent to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to weigh the rights of
attorneys to advertise against the ABA Model Rules and state bar rules in the
light of commercial speech and First Amendment protection.37
In this case, the appellants were two licensed attorneys in the State of
Arizona who in order to generate business, placed an advertisement in a local
newspaper advertising legal services and the prices of the services offered by
29.
30.

425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762; see also U.S. CONST. amend.

I.
31.
CONST. amend. I.
32.
33.
34.

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749–50, 753–54; see also U.S.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749–50.
Id. at 764–65.
Id. at 766, 770.

The challenge now made, however, is based on the First Amendment. This casts
the [b]oard’s justifications in a different light, for on close inspection it is seen that
the [s]tate’s protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages
of their being kept in ignorance. The advertising ban does not directly affect
professional standards one way or the other.

Id. at 769.
35.
Id. at 770; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
37.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363, 384; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1970).

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

5

Nova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6

158

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

the firm.38 The Arizona State Bar claimed that the firm’s use of a newspaper
advertisement to generate business violated Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B)
incorporated by the Supreme Court of Arizona that read:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer
through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television
announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone
directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he
authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.39

A hearing was held before the Special Local Administrative
Committee, which decided that the appellants should be suspended from
practicing law for a period of six months.40 The appellants challenged the
Committee’s decision as a violation of their First Amendment rights. 41
Focusing on their previous decision and precedent set by Virginia Board of
Pharmacy, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the same
First Amendment protection of commercial speech was applicable to
attorney advertisements of legal services and fees.42 The Court explained
that even if a speaker’s intent in making the speech is purely economic, such
speech is protected in certain contexts. 43 Stressing the societal interests
served by commercial speech, the Court discussed how commercial speech
informs the public of the availability, prices, nature of products and services,
and assures “informed and reliable decision-making.”44 Since the decision of
the Court in Bates, attorney advertisements are not subject to complete
prohibition or suppression; however, states retain a right to regulate attorney
advertisements.45
B.

How Far Can Regulation of Attorney Advertisements Go?

Both landmark decisions of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and
Bates determined that commercial speech was protected under the First
Amendment; however, both cases held that states retained the right to
38.
39.

Bates, 433 U.S. at 353–54.
Id. at 355; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)

(1970).
40.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 356.
41.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 357; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
43.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 383–84.
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regulate commercial speech under certain contexts.46 These two Supreme
Court of the United States’ decisions determine that commercial speech is
protected under the First Amendment but retains lesser protection than other
constitutionally protected forms of speech.47 Despite the lessened protection
that commercial speech is granted under the First Amendment, commercial
speech is still protected from unwarranted governmental regulation.48 Both
cases are influential decisions in regard to protection of commercial speech
under the First Amendment; however, neither of these decisions discussed to
what extent commercial speech could be regulated by the government or by
the states.49
Following Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court of
the United States set a standard consisting of a four-prong analysis for what
constitutes commercial speech and the extent of how far the government or
states may regulate commercial speech.50 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,51 the Supreme Court was
presented with the question of whether a regulation from the Public Service
Commission of New York completely banning promotional advertising of an
electrical utility company violated the First Amendment. 52 The Court
defined commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.”53 For commercial speech to be
protected under the First Amendment, the speech must concern lawful
activity and may not be misleading.54 If the speech is concerning lawful
activity and is not misleading, the speech falls within First Amendment
protection. 55 The Court determined that in order to restrict commercial
speech, the asserted governmental interest to be served by the restriction on
commercial speech must be substantial. 56 If the asserted governmental
interest to be served is substantial, it must be “determine[d] whether the
46.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363, 384; Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770–72.
47.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980); Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363; Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761, 770.
48.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 363; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
49.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770; see
also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566; Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
51.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
52.
Id. at 558; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561.
54.
Id. at 564; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
55.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
56.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
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regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether
[the regulation] is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.”57 Taken together, this analysis is known as the Central Hudson
test. 58 Based on the Central Hudson test, in determining whether
commercial speech is guaranteed First Amendment protection and whether
the government or state has the ability to restrict the commercial speech, the
protection of the speech looks at the nature of the expression and nature of
the governmental interest served by the regulation imposed.59 Regulations of
commercial speech are measured under an intermediate scrutiny analysis.60
A state’s restrictions on commercial speech “must be substantially related to
the achievement of an important [state] objective.”61
The Court in Central Hudson held that in order to determine whether
the restriction on commercial speech is in proportion to the government or
state interest, the restriction must directly advance the government or state
interest involved, and if the government or state interest could be served by a
more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restriction will
not meet First Amendment muster.62 In other words, the restriction imposed
may only extend as far as the interest that it serves.63 Similar to Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy and Bates, the Court in Central Hudson held that a
ban on advertising could not survive if the ban is imposed to protect ethical
or professional standards of a profession.64 The Court concluded, as stated in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, “‘[t]he advertising ban does not directly
affect [the] professional standards [of a profession] one way or the other.’”65

57.
58.

Id.
Id.

In commercial speech cases, then, a fourpart analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.

Id.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 563; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995).
Intermediate Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at

564.
63.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564.
64.
Id.; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 378, 383 (1977); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
65.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564 (quoting Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769) (alteration in original).
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The Court found that the state’s interest in upholding professionalism is not a
substantial interest in regulating commercial speech.66
In 1982, the Court took the Central Hudson test and analyzed it from
the perspective of attorney advertisements in the case of In re R.M.J. 67
Comparing this Supreme Court decision to Bates, In re R.M.J. was the first
case subsequent to Central Hudson to apply the four-prong analysis of what
constitutes commercial speech and the extent of regulation permitted on
attorney advertisements.68 The Court in In re R.M.J. emphasized the holding
of Bates, where the Court held that commercial speech protection under the
First Amendment extended to attorney advertisements and “‘advertising by
attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression.’”69 The Court found
in Bates that the advertising of prices for legal services offered was neither
advertising unlawful activity nor a misleading advertisement, preventing the
speech from being prohibited on that basis. 70 The Court in Bates also
rejected suppression of an attorney advertisement based on the state interest
that attorney advertisements had negative effects on the profession.71
The Court in In re R.M.J. found that although Bates was a critical
case in analyzing the extent of protection of attorney advertisements under
the First Amendment, the decision in Bates was a narrow decision in holding
that attorney advertisements could still be regulated by states.72 The Court
found that “[f]alse, deceptive, or misleading advertising remains subject to
restraint, and . . . advertising by the professions poses special risks of
deception, ‘because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services,
misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other
advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.’” 73 In
regards to attorney advertisements, the Court in Bates did not set any
standards or regulations “on potentially or demonstrably misleading
advertis[ements].” 74 However, in circumstances subsequent to Bates, the
Court reasoned that regulation and prohibition of advertisements are
permissible where the advertisements are likely to be misleading. 75 The
66.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 571–72.
67.
455 U.S. 191, 203, 206 (1982).
68.
Id.; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566; Bates, 433 U.S. at
383; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 199 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 383); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
70.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 382–83.
71.
Id. at 368–69, 371.
72.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bates, 433
U.S. at 383.
73.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 383).
74.
Id. at 202.
75.
Id.
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Court in In re R.M.J. set the official standard for the commercial speech
doctrine in the context of advertising for professional services as follows:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently
misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such
advertising is subject to abuse, the [s]tate[] may impose
appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited
entirely. But the [s]tates may not place an absolute prohibition on
certain types of potentially misleading information . . . if the
information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.76

Even though a state holds the ability to regulate non-misleading
commercial speech, “the [s]tate must [still] assert a substantial interest, and
the interference with the speech must be in proportion to the interest
served.”77 Regulations on commercial speech and professional advertising
“must be narrowly drawn, and the [s]tate lawfully may regulate only to the
extent regulation furthers the [s]tate’s substantial interest.”78
While Central Hudson established a four-pronged analysis as to
what constitutes commercial speech and the extent that the government may
regulate commercial speech, the Central Hudson test focused on commercial
speech in a general context. 79 The Court in In re R.M.J. took the fourpronged analysis of Central Hudson and applied it to professional
advertising.80 The four-pronged analysis of Central Hudson is used by the
Supreme Court of the United States in determining whether certain contexts
of commercial speech are protected under the First Amendment, and the
extent to which such speech may be regulated by the states.81
C.

The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct

The ABA is a professional organization of lawyers and law students
from all over the nation.82 The ABA was founded in 1878 and has since
expanded to four hundred thousand members, committed to: “[S]erving . . .
76.
Id. at 203.
77.
Id.
78.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
79.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 564–66 (1980).
80.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203–04; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447
U.S. at 566.
81.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
82.
See
About
the
American
Bar
Association,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
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members, improving the legal profession, eliminating bias . . . and advancing
the rule of law throughout the United States and around the world.”83 The
ABA aims to uphold the legal profession and provide practical tools and
resources for lawyers.84
One of the roles of the ABA is to establish model ethical codes,
which the majority of states in the nation have adopted as a part of their own
ethical standards.85 The current ethical rules established by the ABA are the
ABA Model Rules.86 The ABA Model Rules “were adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates in 1983 [and] [s]erve as models for the ethical rules of
most states.”87 California is the only state that does not model their ethical
and professional rules for lawyers after the ABA Model Rules.88 The current
ABA Model Rules set ethical and professional standards for lawyers across
the nation in regard to the client-lawyer relationship, acting as a counselor,
acting as an advocate, transactions with persons other than clients, law firms
and associations, public service, information about legal services, and
maintaining the integrity of the profession.89
The ABA standards regarding attorney advertising and solicitation
are found in Rule 7.2 and Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model Rules.90 The general
rule of attorney advertising is found in Rule 7.2 of the ABA Model Rules and
reads “[s]ubject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may
advertise services through written, recorded or electronic communication,
including public media.” 91 The ABA and ABA Model Rules follow the
precedent by Bates, recognizing that attorney advertisements serve a
fundamental benefit to the consumers in need of legal services.92 The ABA
states:
To assist the public in learning and obtaining legal services,
lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only
through reputation but also through organized information
campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an
active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.; About the Model Rules, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html
(last
visited Dec. 18, 2015).
86.
See About the Model Rules, supra note 85.
87.
Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
88.
About the Model Rules, supra note 85; see also CAL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT (2015).
89.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013).
90.
Id. r. 7.2–.3.
91.
Id. r. 7.2.
92.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977).
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should not seek clientele. However, the public’s need to know
about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising . . .
. The interest in expanding public information about legal services
ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless,
advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are
misleading or overreaching.93

The modern ABA Model Rules completely overturned the ABA’s
1969 ABA Model Code and the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethicsboth
of which defined the traditional view of attorney advertising as
unprofessional and placed complete bans on attorney advertisements.94 After
the ABA Model Rules were adopted in 1983, attorney advertisements were
recognized as protected commercial speech under the First Amendment, and
ethical attorney advertisements came as a result of the Supreme Court of the
United States decisions in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, Bates, and In
re R.M.J.95
The ABA Model Rules discuss the rules of attorney solicitation in
Rule 7.3:
A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone, or real-time
electronic contact solicit professional employment when a
significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s
pecuniary gain, unless the person contacted: (1) is a lawyer; or (2)
has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with
the lawyer. A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by
written, recorded, or electronic communication or by in-person,
telephone or real-time electronic contact even when not otherwise
prohibited by paragraph (a), if: (1) the target of the solicitation has
[been] made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the
lawyer; or (2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or
harassment.96

The distinction that the ABA Model Rules make between the rules
regarding attorney advertising and attorney solicitation involves the use of
real-time or live communications to a specific audience.97 The ABA defines
93.
94.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 cmt. (2013).
About the Model Rules, supra note 85; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1975); CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (Am.
Bar Ass’n 1908).
95.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 199–200 (1982); Bates, 433 U.S. at 383–84;
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770, 773
(1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
96.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 (2013).
97.
See id. r. 7.2 (ABA professional rules of attorney advertisements); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 (2013) (ABA professional rules of attorney solicitations).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol40/iss1/6

12

Juda: Just Shoot Me A Text: The Florida Bar's Regulations On Attorney A

2015]

JUST SHOOT ME A TEXT

165

solicitation as “a targeted communication initiated by the lawyer that is
directed to a specific person and . . . offers to provide, or can reasonably be
understood as offering to provide, legal services.”98 A communication to the
general public is not considered solicitation by the ABA.99 The ABA Model
Rules express concern for potential abuse through solicitation of direct inperson or live communication by a lawyer to a potential client.100 According
to the ABA Model Rules, “[the] potential for abuse inherent in direct inperson, live telephone, or real-time electronic solicitation justifies its
prohibition, particularly since lawyers have alternative means of conveying
necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services.”101 The
ABA Model Rules explain that communications with potential clients can be
sent through other electronic modes of communication that are not
considered to be real-time or live communications, such as e-mail or other
electronic modes of communication.102 The ABA’s goal in prohibiting direct
solicitation by attorneys of potential clients is to prevent a potential client
from hiring an attorney based on undue influence, intimidation, or pressure
under the circumstances.103
The ABA has a substantial interest in prohibiting direct, in-person
solicitation to protect the consumer of legal services; however, targeted or
direct solicitation may benefit the consumer or potential client, as well as the
attorney.104 In an article published by the ABA Journal in 2013, Stephanie
Francis Ward discussed how consistently targeting advertisements to a
specific audience may benefit a legal practice. 105 Ward countered the
traditional belief that lawyers should attract their business clientele through
good work and not through advertisements,106 by stating, “[s]ome lawyers
believe that if you do good work, people will automatically come to you.
They are wrong. People need reminders.” 107 Ward stressed the ABA’s
promotion of direct advertisements by referring to the fact that personal
injury lawyers often send targeted advertisements and letters to accident
98.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 cmt. (2013).
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3. cmt (2013).
104.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
7.3 cmt (2013).
105.
Stephanie Francis Ward, 50 Simple Ways You Can Market Your Practice,
A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2013, 10:19 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/50_simple_
ways_you_can_market_your_practice.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
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victims, and criminal defense lawyers often refer to arrest reports in hopes of
targeting and obtaining potential clients. 108 This practice of targeted
advertisements benefits both the consumers who are in need of legal services
and who may not know how to go about obtaining legal representation and
the attorneys who are in need of business and clientele.109
III.

PROTECTED FORMS OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS

Looking at the ABA Model Rules and at the ethical and professional
rules of the states that are modeled after the ABA Model Rules, there are
many permissible forms of attorney advertisements and solicitation through
written or electronic communications. 110
Two forms of attorney
advertisements that result in a gap between the standards for attorney
advertisements of the ABA and state ethical and professional rules are
indirect and direct solicitation, specifically targeted letters to potential
clients.111
A.

Direct Solicitation v. Indirect Solicitation

In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 112 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that “the [s]tate—or the Bar acting with state
authorization—constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients
in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that
the [s]tate has a right to prevent.”113 In this case, the appellant, a practicing
lawyer, learned of a young girl who was a driver in a recent car accident.114
The appellant visited the young accident victim in the hospital, where he told
the accident victim that he would represent her, and subsequently, the
accident victim signed an agreement retaining the appellant’s legal
representation and agreed that the appellant would receive one-third of the
victim’s recovery.115
After obtaining the signed retainer agreement with the accident
victim, the appellant contacted the passenger of the vehicle that the victim
was driving and informed the passenger that she had a chance of recovery
108.
Id.
109.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376–77 (1977).
110.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2(a), 7.3(a)–(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2013); About the Model Rules, supra note 85.
111.
See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3(a)–(b) (2013).
112.
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
113.
Id. at 449.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. at 450.
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against the driver and persuaded her to sign a contingent fee agreement.116
When the passenger of the vehicle decided she did not want to sue the driver
and attempted to revoke her agreement with the appellant, the appellant
claimed that the agreement was binding and could not be revoked.117 The
driver of the vehicle also attempted to revoke her agreement with the
appellant.118 Both the driver and passenger of the vehicle brought complaints
against the appellant with the Grievance Committee of the Geauga County
Bar Association. 119 These complaints were later referred to the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
who determined that the appellant violated the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility, and appellant argued that it was his First Amendment right to
solicit his legal services to potential clients.120
In Ohralik, the Court stated that “[t]he solicitation of business by a
lawyer through direct, in-person communication with [a] prospective client
has long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession’s ideal of the
attorney-client relationship and as posing a significant potential for harm to
the prospective client.”121 The Court determined that a state has a stronger
interest in heavily regulating direct in-person solicitation than in regulating
indirect attorney advertisements made towards the public.122 In-person direct
solicitation by attorneys of potential clients is still considered to be
commercial speech and thus protected under the First Amendment; however,
in-person direct solicitation receives a lower level of judicial scrutiny.123 The
Court distinguished the in-person solicitation used by the appellant in
Ohralik from the indirect advertising at issue in Bates, in that in-person
solicitation may discourage potential clients in need of legal representation
and “may disservice the individual and societal interest, identified in Bates,
in facilitating ‘informed and reliable decision-making.’”124 The Court also
recognized a significant difference between in-person direct solicitation and
indirect advertisements in that “[u]nlike a public advertisement, which
simply provides information and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or
not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an
immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
350, 364 (1974).
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Id. at 449, 451.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 452–53; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454.
Id. at 457–58.
Id. at 457; see also U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457–58; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
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reflection.”125 In-person solicitation—because of the intimidation and undue
influence that it has the potential to cause—does not stand up to the
precedent set forth by the Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Bates, in
holding that commercial speech, specifically attorney advertisements, serve
the fundamental function of informing the public of the availability and
nature of goods and services and promote rational decision-making.126
The Court in Ohralik, held that a state has a substantial interest in
regulating in-person direct solicitation by attorneys to potential clients,
because “the potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a
lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an
unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.”127 It was decided by the
Court that a state has reason to believe that in-person solicitation may be
harmful to the person who is solicited, and thus, the state has an interest in
protecting its people from this harm.128 The Court held that being officers of
the courts, attorneys serve the role of administering justice and a state has an
interest in regulating attorneys and the standards of the legal profession,
including setting forth standards regarding attorney advertisements.129
The Supreme Court of the United States set fundamental precedent
regarding direct and indirect solicitation and attorney advertisements in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.130
In this case the appellant was a practicing attorney who in hopes of
expanding his practice, ran advertisements for his law firm in a local
newspaper.131 The appellant targeted defendants of drunk driving cases.132
When the Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel saw the appellant’s
newspaper advertisement, the appellant was informed that his advertisement
violated the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibited
offering representation to criminal defendants on a contingent-fee basis. 133
Appellant then withdrew the advertisement.134 One year later, the appellant
ran another newspaper advertisement targeting women who had suffered
injuries from the use of a particular contraceptive device. 135 As with the
125.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
126.
See id. at 457, 466–67; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 364; Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764–65 (1976).
127.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464–65.
128.
Id. at 466.
129.
Id. at 460.
130.
471 U.S. 626, 641–42, 645–47 (1985).
131.
Id. at 629–30.
132.
Id.
133.
Id. at 630; see also OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C)
(1970).
134.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 630.
135.
Id. at 630–31.
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targeted drunk driving advertisements previously posted by the appellant,
this advertisement attracted the attention of the Ohio Office of Disciplinary
Counsel. 136 The appellant was charged with violating several disciplinary
rules of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, including that the
targeted drunk driving advertisement was “‘false, fraudulent, . . . and
deceptive to the public’ because it offered representation on a contingent-fee
basis in a criminal case” and the advertisement targeted toward injured
women was not dignified and violated the state rule that “[a] lawyer who has
given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take
legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice.”137 In its
opinion, the Court stressed that because the appellant was proposing a
commercial transaction, the appellant’s speech was commercial and fell
within the boundaries of First Amendment protection.138 The question for
the Court then was the extent that the use of direct advertisements may be
regulated.139 Throughout its holding, the Court kept in mind that complete
prohibition or “blanket bans on price advertising by attorneys and rules
preventing attorneys from using non-deceptive terminology to describe their
fields of practice are impermissible.” 140 The Court also kept in mind
throughout its holding, that in regards to rules prohibiting in-person
solicitation, there are some circumstances where rules prohibiting in-person
solicitation of potential clients by attorneys may be permissible. 141
Differentiating the use of in-person solicitation by the appellant in Ohralik,
with the use of newspaper advertisements by the appellant in Zauderer, the
Court determined that the use of newspaper advertisements, though directed
toward a specific audience, did not invade the privacy of those individuals
who read the newspaper and saw the advertisement for legal services.142 The
Court further discussed that print advertisements do not have the same high
risk of overreaching or undue influence that in-person solicitation has. 143
The Court stated:
Print advertising may convey information and ideas more or less
effectively, but in most cases, it will lack the coercive force of the
136.
137.

Id. at 631.
Id. at 631–33 (footnote omitted); see also OHIO CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)(1), 104(A), 106(C) (1970).
138.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637–38; see also Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (holding that commercial speech includes
any speech that proposes a commercial transaction).
139.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629.
140.
Id. at 638.
141.
Id.; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457–58.
142.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
143.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642.
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personal presence of a trained advocate. In addition, a printed
advertisement, unlike a personal encounter initiated by an attorney,
is not likely to involve pressure on the potential client for an
immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.144

An indirect advertisement, although aimed toward a specific
audience, allows a potential client to reflect on the need and ability of hiring
a particular lawyer and to freely make the choice of hiring a particular
attorney, without undue influence or added pressure of in-person
solicitation.145 In the case of Ohralik, the state had a substantial interest in
regulating in-person solicitation of potential clients by attorneys in order to
protect its citizens from undue influence or intimidation. 146 The Court
determined that this substantial state interest could not stand to regulate the
use of indirect solicitation of potential clients by attorneys, because indirect
advertisements do not carry the same risk of undue influence that in-person
solicitations carry.147
B.

Targeted Letters to Potential Clients

In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 148 the Supreme Court of the
United States was faced with the issue of “whether a [s]tate may . . . prohibit
lawyers from soliciting [and advertising] legal business for pecuniary gain by
sending truthful and non-deceptive letters to potential clients known to face
particular legal problems.”149 The petitioner was a practicing attorney who
filed for approval by the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission of a
letter that he had hopes of sending “‘to potential clients who . . . had a
foreclosure suit filed against them.’”150 “The Commission did not find the
letter [to be] false or misleading,” however, the Commission did find that the
letter violated a “Kentucky Supreme Court Rule [that] prohibited the mailing
or delivery of written advertisements ‘precipitated by a specific event or
occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct
from the general public.’”151 The Commission then urged the Supreme Court
of Kentucky to amend its rules after finding that the rule “ban[ning] . . .
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 462, 466 (holding that a state has reason to
assume that in-person solicitation of potential clients by an attorney will be injurious to the
person who is solicited).
147.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642.
148.
486 U.S. 466 (1988).
149.
Id. at 468.
150.
Id. at 469.
151.
Id. at 469–70.
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targeted, direct mail advertise[ments] violated the First Amendment.”152 The
petitioner then petitioned the Kentucky Bar Association’s Committee on
Legal Ethics for an advisory opinion on the validity of the rule, which
resulted in the Committee on Legal Ethics’ adoption of the ABA’s Rule 7.3
on attorney solicitation.153
In analyzing targeted direct solicitation by attorneys to potential
clients, the Court reiterated its fundamental holding in Zauderer that “[t]he
‘unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers [that] justified a
prophylactic rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in such solicitation for
pecuniary gain,’ . . . are not present in the context of written
advertisements.”154 The Court pointed out that previous precedent set by the
Court in regards to attorney advertisements never distinguished between the
constitutionality and protection of various modes of written advertisements
to the general public.155 The Court made the analysis based upon the four
prong analysis of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.156 The Court here
distinguishes between advertisements that target specific individuals and
read “[i]t has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on”
and advertisements that more broadly read “[i]s your home being foreclosed
on?” 157 The Court determined that the advertisement not targeting specific
individuals is commercial speech that can be regulated or prohibited. 158
Whereas, the more broad advertisement could not be prohibited without
violating the First Amendment as long as the advertisement was not false,
misleading, or advertising unlawful activity.159
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, the preceding court below the
Supreme Court of the United States, had relied on the holding of Ohralik and
found that the state’s complete prohibition on all targeted, direct mail
solicitation was permissible under the First Amendment, because of the
“serious potential for abuse inherent in direct solicitation by lawyers of
potential clients known to need specific legal services.” 160 The Supreme
Court of the United States in its holding did not agree that the precedent set
152.
Id. at 470; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
153.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
154.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472 (alteration in original) (quoting Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985)).
155.
Id. at 473.
156.
See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
157.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473.
158.
Id. at 472–73.
159.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473, 479.
160.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
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by Ohralikthat direct in-person solicitation by attorneys of potential
clientswas present in the case of Shapero regarding targeted, direct mail
solicitation.161 The Court made a fundamental distinction between direct and
indirect solicitation.162 The Court stated:
Of course, a particular potential client will feel equally
overwhelmed by his legal troubles and will have the same
impaired capacity for good judgment regardless of whether a
lawyer mails him an untargeted letter or exposes him to a
newspaper advertisement—concededly constitutionally protected
activities—or instead mails a targeted letter. The relevant inquiry
is not whether there exist potential clients whose condition makes
them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of
communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit
any such susceptibility.163

The Court found that it is not to whom the targeted solicitation is
sent that makes the solicitation prone to regulation, but the mode of
communication in which the solicitation is sent that makes the solicitation
prone to regulation.164 The mode of communication is a fundamental factor
in determining whether direct solicitation is overreaching or cause for undue
influence.165
Compared to print advertising, targeted direct mail solicitation
“‘poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence’ than does inperson solicitation.”166 The Court held that written communications, either
targeted or made toward the general public do not “involve[] ‘the coercive
force of the personal presence of a trained advocate’ or the ‘pressure on the
potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of
representation.’”167 People receiving a written communication has the ability
to draw their attention either towards or away from the solicitation.168 A
targeted letter also does not have the ability to invade the privacy of a
recipient any more than an attorney solicitation directed to the public at large
can invade on a recipient’s privacy. 169 The Court ultimately held that “a
truthful and non-deceptive letter, no matter how big its type and how much it
161.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475–76; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 467–68.
162.
See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474–75.
163.
Id. at 474.
164.
See id. at 475.
165.
Id.
166.
Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985)).
167.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642).
168.
Id. at 475–76.
169.
Id. at 476.
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speculates, can never shout at the recipient or grasp him by the lapels, . . . as
can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face solicitation.” 170 Because attorney
advertisements are commercial speech and thus, protected under the First
Amendment, a state may not raise a substantial interest in restricting truthful
and non-deceptive lawyer solicitations, including targeted direct mail
solicitations.171
IV.
A.

FLORIDA’S REGULATIONS ON ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS
Recognizing Commercial Speech Protection in Florida

The State of Florida has long been known for its strict standards in
regulating attorney advertisements. 172 Florida first recognized attorney
advertisements as commercial speech and protected under the First
Amendment in the year 1989. 173 Following the precedents set by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the
Florida Bar took the initiative of conducting a survey of the public opinion
on attorney advertising, and “[a]fter conducting hearings, . . . surveys, and
reviewing extensive public commentary, the [Florida] Bar determined that
several changes to its advertising rules were in order.”174 As a result of these
findings, “[i]n late 1990 the [Supreme Court of Florida] adopted the [Florida]
Bar’s proposed amendments with some modifications.” 175 The Supreme
Court of Florida took the initiative to pass the amended rules to attorney
advertisements because of the precedents set by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Bates. 176 The
Supreme Court of Florida cited Bates stating that the Supreme Court upheld
“‘reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising.’”177
The Supreme Court of Florida explained “[s]ince lawyers render professional
170.
Id. at 479 (citation omitted).
171.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
172.
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Tera Jckowski Peterson, Medium-Specific
Regulation of Attorney Advertising: A Critique, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 259, 260 (2007).
173.
Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995); Fla. Bar: Petition
to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1990);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
174.
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 620; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
175.
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 620; see also Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend
the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d at 452.
176.
Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert.
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 456–57; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
177.
Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert.
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 458 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 384).
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services [that] vary from attorney to attorney, case to case, and client to
client, the potential for deception . . . in advertising is great.” 178 The
amended rules to attorney advertisements in Florida supported “reasonable
restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising” and reduced
deception of potential clients caused by advertisements.179 These amended
Florida Bar Rules were the first amendments to the Florida Bar Rules
subsequent to the Supreme Court decisions of Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy and Bates, upholding commercial speech as protected under the
First Amendment and extending this protection to attorney advertisements.180
Maintaining its strict regulations on attorney advertisements, Florida has
proceeded to “push[] the First Amendment envelope that safeguards the right
of attorneys to inform potential clients about the [legal] services they
offer.”181
The Florida Bar, even after the Supreme Court of Florida passed the
amended rules allowing Florida to be a more permissive state towards
attorney advertisement, continued to reveal its beliefs about the negative
effects that attorney advertisements place on the legal profession.182 In 1994,
after the attorney advertising rules were recently amended to allow attorney
advertisements, former Florida Bar President, Patricia A. Seitz, expressed to
the ABA that “‘[a]ggressive ads have caused the public to see the legal
system as a lottery of fictitious claims in which lawyers make out like
bandits in fees.’” 183 Patricia A. Seitz also expressed that attorney
advertisements were to blame for “‘increas[ing] the public’s cynicism about
the legal system, which undermines the system that lawyers take an oath to
uphold.’”184 In the year 2000, as advertisements became more popular and
used amongst attorneys, the Florida Bar decided that it was time to take a
stronger stance against attorneys who violated any Florida rules regarding
attorney advertisements.185 The Florida Bar subsequently passed a motion to
178.
Id.
179.
Id. (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 384).
180.
Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert.
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 457–58; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 770.
181.
Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 261.
182.
See Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—
Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d at 452, 455; Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 260 n.1.
183.
James Podgers, Image Problem: Burned by a Fall in Public Favor, the
Organized Bar Turns Up the Heat on Lawyer Advertising, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 66, 68; see
also Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So.
2d at 452, 455.
184.
Podgers, supra note 183, at 68.
185.
Gary Blankenship, Bar to Take a Harder Line Toward Lawyer Ad
Violations, FLA. B. NEWS, July 1, 2000, at 13.
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initiate grievances against any Florida Bar attorney who violated the Bar
rules in regard to attorney advertisements.186 The Bar’s motive for initiating
grievances against violators of the Florida Bar rules of attorney
advertisements was due to appeals. 187 The Bar was frustrated that since
advertisement appeals take several months, attorneys may still run their
advertisements, and by the time the appeal has been decided, the
advertisement could have already been exposed through various media and
communications.188
The Florida Bar maintained its strong grip on regulating attorney
advertisements in 2004, when it was announced that the Florida Bar was
forming an Advertising Task Force. 189 The purpose of creating the
Advertising Task Force was to review Florida’s attorney advertisement
regulations and determine when changes or amendments to the rules would
be necessary. 190 The Florida Bar President at the time, Kelly Overstreet
Johnson, expressed that “many lawyers still dislike or oppose lawyer
advertising, believing [it is] the [strongest] cause of public discontent with
the profession.”191 Johnson also explained that because Supreme Court of
the United States precedent prohibits complete bans on attorney
advertisements, it is important to make sure that the Florida Bar’s rules
remain “as consistent . . . as possible and enforced.”192
In 2013, the Florida Bar petitioned to the Supreme Court of Florida
to consider proposed amendments to Subchapter 4-7 of the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar. 193 The Florida Bar proposed to the Supreme Court of
Florida that they strike all current rules regarding attorney advertisements
and adopt entirely new rules, which ultimately the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted. 194 The adoption of entirely new rules regarding attorney
advertisements was due to a “contemporary study of lawyer advertising,
which . . . include[d] public evaluation and comments about lawyer
advertising.”195 After analyzing the findings, the Florida Bar came to the
186.
Id.
187.
See id.
188.
Id.
189.
See New Bar Panel to Review Attorney Advertising Rules, FLA. B. NEWS,
Dec. 15, 2003, at 1.
190.
Id.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Subchapter 4-7,
Lawyer Advert. Rules, 108 So. 3d 609, 609 (Fla. 2013); see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 4-7.11 (2014).
194.
In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Subchapter 4-7,
108 So. 3d at 609, 611.
195.
Id. at 609–10.
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conclusion that entirely new rules, which prevent the “dissemination of
misleading and unduly manipulative information,” should be adopted. 196
The new advertising rules were “designed to make the advertising rules more
cohesive, easier for lawyers who advertise to understand, and less
cumbersome for the [Florida] Bar to apply and enforce.”197
B.
Distinguishing Standards of the Florida Bar and the American Bar
Association
Florida is a state that has modeled its ethical and professional rules
of conduct after the ABA Model Rules.198 Florida’s Rules of Professional
Conduct regarding attorney advertisements and solicitations are found in
Rule 4-7.18, which reads:
Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this rule, a lawyer may
not: (1) solicit, or permit employees or agents of the lawyer to
solicit on the lawyer’s behalf, professional employment from a
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior
professional relationship, in person or otherwise, when a
significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s
pecuniary gain. The term solicit includes contact in person, by
telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, or by other communication
directed to a specific recipient and includes any written form of
communication, including any electronic mail communication,
directed to a specific recipient and not meeting the requirements of
subdivision (b) of this rule and rules 4-7.11 through 4-7.17 of these
rules; [and] (2) enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect a fee
for professional employment obtained in violation of this rule.199

The Florida Bar Standing Committee on Advertising’s Handbook on
Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation also contains regulations that lawyers in
the State of Florida must comply with, in addition to the Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct. 200 The Handbook on Lawyer Advertising and
Solicitation cites Rule 4-7.11(a) of the Florida Rules of Professional
Conduct: “Florida’s lawyer advertising rules apply to all forms of
communication seeking legal employment in any print or electronic forum,
including but not limited to newspapers, magazines, brochures, flyers,
television, radio, direct mail, electronic mail, and Internet, including banners,
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 610.
Id.
See About the Model Rules, supra note 85.
FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(a) (2014).
See FLA. BAR STANDING COMM. ON ADVERTISING, HANDBOOK ON LAWYER
ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 1 (10th ed. 2013, rev. 2014).
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pop-ups, websites, social networking, and video sharing media.”201 In regard
to Rule 4-7.18 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct and prohibited
forms of attorney solicitation, the Handbook on Lawyer Advertising and
Solicitation states:
A lawyer may not contact a prospective client in person, by
telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, or through other means of direct
contact, unless the prospective client is a family member, current
client, or former client. This prohibition does not extend to
unsolicited direct mail or email communications made in
compliance with Rule 4-7.18(b).202

Attorneys who advertise through direct mail and email
communications must not use “‘coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching,
harassment, intimidation, or undue influence’” in order to obtain clientele.203
According to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer is not
permitted to send potential clients advertisements through direct mail or
email communications if the lawyer has been informed that the potential
client does not wish to receive the communications from the lawyer.204
On a national perspective, Rule 7.2 and Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model
Rules set the standards for attorney advertisements and solicitations.205 In
contrast to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct that specifically list the
modes of communications in which a lawyer may not advertise to a potential
client, Rule 7.2 of the ABA Model Rules states that “a lawyer may advertise
services through written, recorded or electronic communication, including
public media.”206 Some of the communications in which Florida prohibits
lawyers from advertising through are permitted by the ABA Model Rules.207
For example, it can be argued that telephone communications classify as
electronic communications and are thus permissible under the ABA Model
Rules, but not permissible under the Florida Rules of Professional

201.
Id. at 2.
202.
Id. at 4.
203.
HANDBOOK ON LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200,
at 19; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(b) (2014).
204.
HANDBOOK ON LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200,
at 19; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(b) (2014).
205.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2, 7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013); see
also supra Section II.C.
206.
See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11(a)–(b) (2014); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2(a) (2013).
207.
See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11 (2014); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 (2013).
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Conduct. 208 Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model Rules specifically discusses
solicitation of clients by attorneys and distinguishes that a lawyer may not
solicit through any live or real-time communications; whereas the Florida
Rules of Professional Conduct define solicit as in-person communications.209
V.

EXTENDING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION TO ATTORNEY
ADVERTISEMENTS VIA TEXT MESSAGES

A.
Classifying Attorney Advertisements Via Text Messages as Protected
Commercial Speech
A Florida law firm has recently challenged the Florida Bar for
denying the law firm’s proposal of sending automated text messages to
potential clients advertising the firm’s legal services. 210 The Florida Bar
classified automated text messages to potential clients as direct solicitation
by telephone prohibited by the Florida Advertising Rules and Florida Rules
of Professional Conduct.211 The law firm has argued that text messages may
be classified as direct mail or email, which are permitted by the Florida
Advertising Rules and the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.212 Based
on the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in regards to
direct and indirect attorney advertisements, text messages more closely
resemble the indirect communications in Shapero than the direct solicitation
analyzed in Ohralik.213
When analyzing attorney advertisements through the use of text
messages, direct text messages to potential clients by attorneys reflect the
same communications that the Supreme Court of the United States analyzed
in Shapero.214 Similar to the issue in the case of the Florida law firm sending
direct text messages to potential clients, the Supreme Court of the United
States was left with the question of whether a state may prohibit direct letters
to targeted potential clients in Shapero. 215 As the Court pointed out in
208.

See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11(a) (2014); MODEL RULES
r. 7.2(a) (2013).
209.
See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.18(a)(1) (2014); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3(a) (2013).
210.
Hale, supra note 15.
211.
FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.18(a)(1) (2014); HANDBOOK ON
LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200, at 4; Hale, supra note 15.
212.
Hale, supra note 15; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18
(2014).
213.
See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
214.
See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 479.
215.
Id. at 468; Hale, supra note 15.
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Shapero, a recipient of written communications has the ability to read the
communication or avert their attention away from the communication. 216
Text messages, like letters, have the ability to be read, ignored and looked at
later, or if the recipient chooses, not even seen at all.217 In this respect, text
messages are similar to written communications, such as emails or letters.218
In the context of direct solicitation, text messages do not reflect the
same in-person solicitation that the Court analyzed in Ohralik.219 In-person
solicitation, or live communications such as soliciting through the telephone,
are distinguished from text messages in that text messages do not have the
same high risk of intimidation or undue influence that live or in-person
solicitation may have.220 Recipients of text messages are not pressured to
accept legal representation immediately and are not pressured by the
presence of an attorney.221 Advertisements sent via text message also allow
the recipient to reflect on the message, compare the nature and availability of
goods and services, and allow for rational decision-making.222 Unlike direct
in-person solicitations, text messages are not immediate communications that
urge an immediate response. 223 Attorney advertisements via text message
are classified as commercial speech and are thus deserving of First
Amendment protection because they are direct communications that propose
a transaction and serve the public interest of informing the public of the
availability, nature, and prices of services.224
216.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475–76 (“A letter, like a printed advertisement—but
unlike a lawyer—can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or
discarded.”).
217.
See id.
218.
See id.; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985).
219.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436
U.S. 447, 457 (1978).
220.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
221.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (“Print advertising may convey information and
ideas more or less effectively, but in most cases, it will lack the coercive force of the personal
presence of a trained advocate.”); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465 (“[T]he potential for overreaching
is significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion,
personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.”).
222.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364
(1977) (holding that “commercial speech . . . inform[s] the public of the availability, nature,
and prices of products and services, and . . . serves individual and societal interests in assuring
informed and reliable decision-making.”).
223.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (“In addition, a printed advertisement, unlike a
personal encounter initiated by an attorney, is not likely to involve pressure on the potential
client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.”); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
457 (“The aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to provide a one-sided presentation
and to encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed decision-making.”).
224.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 364; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Text Messages Applied to the Central Hudson test

If attorney advertisements via text messages are classified as
commercial speech, in order to determine whether such commercial speech
may be restricted or prohibited by a state, the Central Hudson test must be
applied.225 The first prong of the four-part analysis asks whether the speech
is protected under the First Amendment. 226 Bates extended commercial
speech protection to attorney advertisements, allowing attorney
advertisements to be considered protected First Amendment speech. 227
Attorney advertisements via text messages propose a transaction and inform
the public of the availability of goods and services, qualifying as commercial
speech. 228 Attorney advertisements via text messages, which do not
advertise unlawful activity and are not misleading or deceptive, meet the
conditions for First Amendment protection.229
The second part of the Central Hudson test requires that the asserted
governmental interest be substantial.230 In regard to the Florida Bar denying
a Florida law firm’s proposal to send automated text messages to potential
clients, the Florida Bar can argue that its asserted interest in restricting the
automated text messages would be to protect Florida citizens in need of legal
services.231 As the Court found in the case of Ohralik, a state has reason to
assume that in-person solicitation of potential clients by an attorney may be
harmful to the person who is solicited.232 However, text messages, like other
written communications, do not have the ability to intimidate or cause undue
influence like other forms of in-person solicitation. 233
Attorney
advertisements also serve the important function of informing consumers of
goods, which is fundamental to the freedom of speech of both attorneys and
consumers.234 This asserted state interest of protecting consumers in Florida
would fail in the case of attorney advertisements via text messages.235 The
225.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
226.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
227.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
228.
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56.
229.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
230.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566, 568–69.
231.
See Hale, supra note 15.
232.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466.
233.
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (holding that print advertisements generally
pose a much less risk of overreaching or undue influence than in-person solicitation).
234.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; Bates, 433 U.S. at
364.
235.
See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466 (holding the State has reason to assume inperson solicitation of potential clients by an attorney will be injurious to the person who is
solicited).
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Florida Bar may also argue that direct solicitation should be prohibited in
order to maintain the nobleness of the legal profession.236 As the Court held
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, a state interest in upholding
professionalism of a field may not be a sufficient interest in restricting
commercial speech.237 The asserted state interest in upholding the dignity of
the legal profession would also fail under the Central Hudson test in
analyzing attorney advertisements via text messages to potential clients.238
If the asserted state interests were determined to be substantial, it
must then be determined whether the restrictions directly advance the
asserted state interest.239 If the Florida Bar were to assert the interests of
protecting consumers or upholding the legal profession, then restricting text
messages by attorneys to potential clients would have to carry out these
interests. 240 The restrictions also may not be more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.241 If the Florida Bar were able to carry out
its asserted interests without restricting or prohibiting attorney
advertisements via text messages, then the restriction or prohibition of the
commercial speech would violate the First Amendment.242
C.

Keeping up with Modern Modes of Communication

In the year 2000, the Florida Bar noted that a “member of the Florida
Bar might feel lost without a cell phone.”243 Fifteen years later, that opinion
should not have changed considering that technology has only grown more
popular and become more useful.244 The opinion of the Florida Bar in 2000
was that technology must be “utilize[d] . . . to become more efficient and [to]
provide the public with a better justice system.”245 At the time, technology
was seen as “giving the decision-maker more information to make . . .

236.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 766 (1976).
237.
See id. at 766, 770.
238.
Id. at 766 (holding an asserted state interest in upholding professionalism
of a field may not be sufficient); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
239.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
240.
See id.
241.
See id.
242.
See id. (holding that a state’s asserted interest in restricting commercial
speech must be narrowly drawn and may not be more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest).
243.
Gary Blankenship, The Florida Bar: Changing Through Technology,
FLA. B. J., Apr. 2000, at 37, 37.
244.
See Hale, supra note 15.
245.
Blankenship, supra note 243, at 39–40.
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decision[s].” 246 Relating to commercial speech, attorneys who choose to
advertise must ensure that their advertisements are able to keep up with
evolving technology in order to provide consumers with the knowledge of
the nature and availability of goods and services.247 If in the year 2000, the
Florida Bar was noting how extensive the use of cell phones were, this
number has only expanded, and attorneys today must also utilize these
communications.248
In 2000, evolving technology was already a major concern for the
practice of law, as stated, “[t]echnology—and how lawyers use it—will be an
important factor in determining what the practice of law looks like in the
next [ten] years, let alone the next [fifty].”249 It is important for lawyers to
recognize where the profession is headed and be able to keep up with the
profession. 250 Society and technology is something that is constantly and
rapidly changing that lawyers, along with state bar associations, must be able
to recognize. 251
Rules regarding commercial speech and attorney
advertisements should also be flexible and able to keep up with society and
technology. 252 It will be “[t]he lawyers who are able to stay on top of
changing times [that will be] the ones who are going to be successful.”253
There will be even more expansive growth and changes in technology, and it
is essential that the legal profession, including commercial speech and
attorney advertisements, be able to keep up with these changes.254
VI.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the history of the legal profession, advertising by
attorneys has consistently been looked down upon and considered
unprofessional. 255
These consistent negative views of attorney
advertisements have influenced the ethical and professional standards of the

246.
Id. at 40.
247.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (“And commercial
speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and
services, and thus performs an indispensible role in the allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system.”).
248.
See Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40; Hale, supra note 15.
249.
Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40.
250.
Id.
251.
See id.
252.
Id.; DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212.
253.
Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40.
254.
See id.
255.
See DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212; Brace, supra note 3, at 110–11; supra
Part I.
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ABA, as well as a majority of state bar ethical and professional standards.256
It was not until 1977 in the case of Bates, where the Supreme Court of the
United States determined attorney advertisements to be commercial speech
and thus protected under the First Amendment, that the ABA standards and
state bar ethical and professional rules began to permit attorneys to freely
advertise their legal services and fees.257 Even after the Court extended First
Amendment protections to attorney advertisements, ethical and professional
rules have still maintained strict standards and regulations on attorney
advertisements. 258 These strict regulations consist of the delicate balance
between maintaining the honor and dignity of the legal profession and
upholding the First Amendment rights of attorneys to freely advertise their
legal services and fees.259 Florida is a state that has consistently placed some
of the strictest regulations on attorney advertisements.260
Attorney advertisements that directly solicit potential clients are a
great concern for the ABA, as well as state bar associations, including the
Florida Bar.261 One of the modes of communication that is currently at issue
in the State of Florida, is targeted automated text messages to potential
clients. 262 The Florida Bar has struck down a firm’s proposed plan of
sending automated text messages to potential clients, as direct solicitation via
telephone in violation of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.263 Upon
a closer analysis of the use of text messages by attorneys to potential clients,
these communications more closely resemble the direct solicitation that was
held to be constitutionally protected commercial speech in Zauderer and
Shapero. 264 Text messages sustain the fundamental public interest of
informing consumers of the nature, availability, and prices of available
services and promote rational decision-making by the consumer.265
In conclusion, the Florida Bar should allow attorney advertisements
via text messages because these communications are considered protected
256.
See DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212; Brace, supra note 3, at 110–11; supra
Section I.C.
257.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977); Brace, supra note 3,
at 111, 113; Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 263–64, 272–73.
258.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 379; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (2013).
259.
See supra Part I.
260.
Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 260–61; see also supra Part IV.
261.
See supra Section III.B.
262.
See supra Parts I, V.
263.
See supra Part I.
264.
See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 475–76, 478 (1988);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641–42
(1985); Hale, supra note 15; supra Section V.A.
265.
See supra Part V.
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forms of commercial speech under the First Amendment.266 Text messages
do not invade the privacy of the recipient, nor demand an immediate
response, proving to not violate the ABA Model Rules or Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct.267 Florida must also consider allowing attorneys to
advertise legal services through targeted text messages in order to keep up
with evolving modern communications.268

266.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also supra Part V.
267.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3, 7.3 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N
2013); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18 (2014); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642;
supra Part V.
268.
See supra Section V.C.
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